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AGAINST CITIZENSHIP AS A PREDICATE FOR
BASIC RIGHTS
David D. Cole*
The subject of my remarks will be citizenship, or more precisely the lack
thereof, as a wedge issue on matters of rights, the rule of law, and the war
on terror. I will argue that we ought to be careful about relying on
citizenship as a rallying call for rights and protections precisely because the
distinction between citizenship and its lack has proven to be such a
tempting avenue for illegitimate trade-offs between liberty and security.
I will begin by talking about two cases-the first case in my career that
involved national security and civil liberties and the most recent such case
in which I was involved.
The first involved a woman named Margaret Randall,' an American-born
poet who left the United States in the 1960c- heenme n Meyip,,. cit-ize
while married to a Mexican man, and then lived for about two decades in
Mexico, Cuba, and Nicaragua, before returning to the United States when
she was in her fifties. The United States decided it did not want her back,
and sought to deport her on the ground that she had advocated communism
in her poetry, her journals, and the like.2
Thus, I found myself in my first trial as a young lawyer in 1984, in El
Paso, Texas, defending this American-born poet who was being deported
for advocating communism. The argument was that she had lost her
American citizenship when she took Mexican citizenship. She had become
an alien-and as an alien she was subject to the McCarran-Walter Act,
which at the time made foreign nationals deportable if they had advocated
communism.3
We lost that case in the trial-level immigration court4 but won at the
Board of Immigration Appeals 5 on the ground that she was a U.S. citizen-
not on the ground that foreign nationals have the same rights as citizens to
advocate communism or whatever else they want to advocate.6 Instead, the
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. These remarks were made on September
30, 2006, at the New Dimensions of Citizenship Symposium held at Fordham University
School of Law. This is an edited version of Professor Cole's remarks.
1. See Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1988); David Cole, What's a
Metaphor?: The Deportation of a Poet, 1 Yale J.L. & Liberation 5, 10 (1989).
2. See Randall, 854 F.2d at 475-76.
3. Id. at 473.
4. Id. at 477-78.
5. Cole, supra note 1, at 6.
6. See id.
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Board ruled that she was still a U.S. citizen and, therefore, no matter how
much she advocated communism in her poetry, the government could not
deport her.7
This summer I handled the naturalization trial of Aiad Barakat, a
Palestinian who I have been representing for about twenty years.8 His case
dates back to 1987, when a group of Palestinians in Los Angeles,
subsequently dubbed the "L.A. Eight," 9 were arrested, placed in maximum
security confinement, and put into deportation proceedings on the ground
that they were associated with a faction of the Palestine Liberation
Organization.' 0 For twenty years, we have argued in that case that foreign
nationals and citizens ought to have the same speech and associational
rights as citizens, with limited success. I I None of the eight has been
deported, but the government has not abandoned its efforts to deport them.
During the course of the twenty-year "L.A. Eight" case, Aiad Barakat
became a permanent resident and applied for citizenship. He was denied
naturalization on the basis of his alleged political affiliations. 12 We then
filed a suit in federal court and had a one week trial this past summer on
whether or not he deserved to become a U.S. citizen. At the close of the
trial, the judge ruled that he could in fact become a U.S. citizen. 13 At the
celebration dinner that evening, Aiad jokingly proclaimed that it is now the
"L.A. Seven." Because he is now a citizen, he need not worry about being
punished for his political affiliations and beliefs.
While I am pleased that my clients in both of these cases prevailed and
are here and able to exercise their rights, my own view is that their rights to
speak out and to associate freely should turn in no way on whether they are
citizens or foreign nationals. Citizenship is an important and sometimes all-
encompassing topic of academic and political inquiry, as the wide range of
topics discussed at this Symposium illustrates. My point is a cautionary
one. It is important to decouple the concept of citizenship from claims
about civil liberties. It is especially important for academics and activists
who advocate expanding concepts of citizenship as a way of expanding
rights to be cognizant of the danger such claims may create for those who
are not citizens. The temptation to exploit the line between citizens and
foreign nationals, especially in times of crisis, on matters of basic rights
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Federal Judge in California
Grants Citizenship to Palestinian Man After 20 Years (June 23, 2006), available at
http://www.aclu.org/imnigrants/discrim/26013prs20060623.html [hereinafter ACLU Press
Release].
9. See id.
10. See e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 473 (1999).
11. See, e.g., Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D.
Cal. 1989) (holding that foreign nationals residing in the United States have the same First
Amendment rights as citizens, and declaring the ideological deportation grounds of the
McCaran-Walter Act unconstitutional), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 970
F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1992).
12. See Reno, 525 U.S. at 473-74.
13. See, e.g., ACLU Press Release, supra note 8.
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suggests that we should be careful about advancing theories that may
inadvertently reinforce that temptation.
I will illustrate the dangers we confront by reviewing how the distinction
between citizens and foreign nationals has played a defining role in the
Bush Administration's response to the threat of terror posed, or at least
recognized, in the wake of September 11.
In late 2006, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act (MCA), 14
which subjects anyone whom the executive says is an unlawful enemy
combatant to military trials in which defendants can be tried, convicted, and
executed on the basis of coerced testimony, 15 hearsay, 16 and summaries of
classified evidence that they do not have a meaningful way to confront. 17
The law provides for only limited judicial review in the D.C. Circuit 18 and
strips the federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over the terms and conditions
of the confinement of these detainees. 19 So if "enemy combatants" are
being tortured, for example, they have no access to courts to raise that
claim.
Congress passed this law in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2006
decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,20 holding that the President's executive
order setting forth rules for military tribunals violated a federal statute and
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.2' In the MCA, Congress
declared, ipsi dixit, that the procedures that it established satisfy the
requirements of Common Article 3; namely, that trials must be conducted
in a regularly constituted court providing "'all the judicial guarantees which
are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."' 22 But then, perhaps
because Congress was not quite sure that it had in fact satisfied Common
Article 3, the law goes on to provide that no one can raise the claim that the
procedures violate Common Article 3, because no one is permitted to
invoke the Geneva Conventions in the context of even the limited judicial
review that is provided.23
These rules, however, do not apply to all persons accused of being
unlawful enemy combatants, but only to foreign nationals so accused. 24
That double standard, subjecting foreign nationals to procedures,
obligations, and burdens that we would not likely tolerate if they were
applied to ourselves, has been one of the central leitmotifs of the war on
14. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 10 & 28 U.S.C.).
15. 10 U.S.C.A. § 949a(b)(2)(C) (West 2006).
16. Id. § 949a(b)(2)(E).
17. Id. § 949d(f).
18. Id. § 950d(d).
19. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2441.
20. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
21. Id. at 2795-97.
22. Id. at 2797 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War art. 3(l)(d), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138).
23. 10 U.S.C.A. § 948b(g).
24. Id. § 948d(a).
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terror. Time and again, the Administration has argued that foreign nationals
do not deserve the same rights as citizens, and that we can do to them what
we could not do to ourselves.
The other principal theme of the war on terror is that the President can do
no wrong. The President has argued that his authority under the
Commander-in-Chief Clause to decide how to "engage the enemy," as his
lawyers put it,25 is unconstrained by any statute, constitutional limitation, or
international law.
These twin assertions of power are related. The first claim, the argument
that foreign nationals do not deserve the same rights as citizens, sets the
stage for the second. One of the principal points of my book Enemy
Aliens26 was that if you look at prior national security crises in this country,
in every instance, the first targets were foreign nationals. But also in every
instance, the tactics employed against foreign nationals were ultimately
extended to U.S. citizens. 27 The government eases the introduction of
repressive security measures by targeting them at foreign nationals, but then
gets used to employing unchecked power vis-d-vis one group and seeks out
ways to extend similar power to others.
No one has better captured the initial move of targeting foreign nationals
than Louis Post, who was writing about the Palmer raids, in which the
government responded to a series of terrorist bombings in 1919 by rounding
up thousands of foreign nationals, none of whom were accused or found
guilty of being involved in any of the bombings. Post wrote, "[T]he
delirium [caused by the bombings] turned in the direction of a deportations
crusade with the spontaneity of water flowing along the course of least
resistance." 28
Since September 11, we have seen many examples of this "course of
least resistance," up to and including the Military Commissions Act.
During the roundups after September 11, thousands were picked up, locked
up, called terror suspects, held in secret, often initially without charges,
tried in secret, and presumed guilty until proven innocent. Virtually all of
them were, in fact, determined to have no connection to terrorism. These
measures were defended on the ground that they were applied only to
foreign nationals, and we could employ procedures against them that would
be unacceptable if applied to citizens.
Similarly, the government defends its treatment of the detainees at
Guantdnamo Bay by proclaiming that because they are foreign nationals
outside of our borders, they have no constitutional rights, period. Some of
25. See, e.g., David Cole, The Dictator Defense, Salon.com, Feb. 10, 2006,
http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2006/02/1 0/dictator/.
26. David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the
War on Terrorism (rev. ed. 2005).
27. Id. at 85.
28. Louis F. Post, The Deportations Delirium of Nineteen-Twenty: A Personal
Narrative of an Historic Official Experience 307 (1923).
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those held there will be tried in military tribunals, again under rules that
apply exclusively to foreign nationals
There is no legal reason why military tribunals should apply only to
foreign nationals. 29 We used them in World War II against citizens and
foreign nationals alike. 30 A citizen tried and convicted by a military
tribunal in the Ex parte Quirin3' case objected, in essence, "Wait a minute;
you can't do this to me; I'm a citizen. '32 The U.S. Supreme Court replied
(to paraphrase), "No, it doesn't matter whether you're a citizen or a foreign
national; if you're an enemy, you can be tried in a military commission." 33
So there is no legal impediment to trying citizens in military tribunals.
The impetus for excluding citizens is political. It is easier to sell such
truncated procedures if you can say to the American public, as Dick Cheney
did when the first military commission order was issued,34 that when
foreigners come and attack us, they do not deserve the same rights and
guarantees as U.S. citizens. Again, the message is, "We're not taking away
your rights; we're taking away somebody else's rights."
After September 11, the Bush Administration launched what is surely the
most extensive campaign of ethnic profiling that we have seen in this
country since World War II. It did not lock up 110,000 people because of
their ethnicity, as we did then, but it did require 80,000 to come in for
special registration simply because they were foreign nationals from Arab
and Muslim countries; it called in another 8000 for FBI interviews simply
because they were young men from Arab and Muslim countries; and it
locked up more than 5000 foreign nationals, virtually all of them Arabs and
Muslims, none of whom turned out to be terrorists. 35 When defending this
policy in Congress, Michael Chertoff testified that the Bush Administration
"emphatically rejected ethnic profiling." 36 His next sentence: "What we
have looked to are characteristics like country of issuance of
29. See, e.g., Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10
U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. IV 2004); Press Release, White House, President Issues Military Order
(Nov. 13, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-
27.html.
30. See, e.g., Appointment of a Military Commission, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 2, 1942).
31. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
32. See id. at 24, 37-38.
33. See id. at 37-38.
34. Dick Cheney, Vice President, Remarks to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Nov. 14,
2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20011114-1.html.
35. See David Cole, Less Safe, Less Free, Salon.com, Nov. 19, 2004,
http://archive.salon.com/opinion/feature/2004/11/19/justice/index.html?pn=2; see also Cole,
supra note 26, at xx, 24-26, 47-5 1.
36. Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending
Against Terrorism: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 23 (2001)
(statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of
Justice).
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passport .... ,,37 Once again, the justification is "we do it to them, not to
us.'
Perhaps one of the most outrageous examples of this double standard was
the secret decision by the Justice Department, only disclosed when Alberto
Gonzales was up for confirmation as Attorney General, to interpret the
international treaty banning cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment not to
apply to foreign nationals held overseas in CIA black sites. 38 Here you
have an international treaty that purports to define human rights, yet the
claim is, "Well, it actually only protects Americans and foreign nationals
held within the United States."
Finally, consider Maher Arar,39 the Canadian who upon changing planes
at JFK was pulled out of line, locked up for a week, denied access to a
lawyer, and ordered deported on the basis of secret evidence. When asked
to be sent on his way to Canada, for which he held a connecting ticket, he
was told, in effect, "You don't need that connecting flight coupon because
we've chartered a federal jet for you-to Syria." 40 In Syria, he was locked
up for a year without charges and tortured.41
In a lawsuit I am litigating with the Center for Constitutional Rights on
behalf of Arar, we have challenged as unconstitutional the federal
authorities' rendering of Arar to Syria to be tortured.42 The government's
response is that Arar does not have any rights because he is a foreign
national who never formally entered the United States.43 Accordingly, the
government maintains, he has no right not to be forcibly redirected to a
country in order to be tortured.
In sum, the Administration has consistently treated the "enemy alien" in
this "war on terror" as without rights in order to maximize executive
discretion in how it engages the enemy. At the same time, we have also
seen significant examples of how this move paves the way for broader
assertions of executive power. The executive has claimed that with respect
to torturing suspects, detaining enemy combatants, and warrantless
wiretapping of American citizens, the President is effectively above the law.
It claims that he cannot be constrained by statutes that give courts power to
review the legality of detention, or that make it a crime to torture44 or
37. Id.
38. See John Barry, Michael Hirsh & Michael Isikoff, The Roots of Torture, Newsweek,
May 24, 2004, at 26, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/498948l/.
39. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
40. Id. at 252-53.
41. Id. at 254-56.
42. Id.
43. SeeArar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
44. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Office of the Assistant Att'y Gen., to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Regarding Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us-law/etn/gonzales/memos dir/memo_20020801_JD_%2
OGonz_.pdf.
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engage in warrantless wiretapping, 45 because the President's options cannot
be restricted when he engages the enemy in wartime. 46 Those arguments
are an extension of the initial claim, namely that the President cannot be
constrained with respect to one particular class of people, foreign nationals.
The Commander-in-Chief claims assert unfettered power over everyone,
even if predicated on the need to deal with "the enemy."
The Supreme Court rejected the Bush Administration's claim of
unfettered executive power in both Rasul v. Bush,47 the Guantdnamo Bay
detainees case, and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,48 the case involving a U.S. citizen
captured in Afghanistan and held as an enemy combatant. In Hamdi,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote for the Court, "Whatever power the
United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with
other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties
are at stake." 49
Hamdi involved a U.S. citizen, and the Court emphasized that fact
approximately twenty-five times in its opinion,50 without ever explaining
what relevance citizenship had to whether Hamdi had constitutional rights
as against his detention here. In the end, the Court held that Hamdi's due
process protections required a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. 51
In fact, Hamdi's citizenship should not even have been relevant to the
due process issue. Due process analysis in this setting essentially consists
of weighing the government's interests in national security against the
individual's interest in a deprivation of liberty.52 On neither side of that
scale should it make any difference whether a detained individual holds a
U.S. or Saudi Arabian passport. If people pose a threat to national security,
it does not matter what passport they have, and if they are locked up, they
are deprived of the same liberty, regardless of what passport they have. Yet
the Court repeatedly described the right as the right of a citizen to these
kinds of protections. 53
45. See, e.g., Press Release, White House, Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence
(Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-
l.html.
46. See David Cole, Reviving the Nixon Doctrine: NSA Spying, the Commander-in-
Chief and Executive Power in the War on Terror, 13 Wash. & Lee J. of Civ. Rts. & Soc.
Just., Fall 2006, at 16 (citing and discussing executive claims of uncheckable Commander-
in-Chief power).
47. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
48. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
49. Id. at 536 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989)).
50. See generally id.
51. Id. at 535.
52. Id. at 528-29 (citing Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
53. See, e.g., id. at 537 (stating that "a citizen detained as an enemy combatant is entitled
to [due] process" and that "due process demands some system for a citizen detainee to refute
his classification [as a terrorist]" (emphasis added)).
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A much better way of approaching the issue is reflected in the British
Law Lords' decision in A & Others v. Secretary of State for Home
Department,54 which reviewed a post-9/ll law that permitted the
government to lock up foreign nationals as suspected terrorists indefinitely
without charges. 55 The Law Lords declared this law incompatible with the
European Convention on Human Rights precisely because it impermissibly
distinguished between foreign nationals and citizens. 56 The Lords reasoned
that it is irrational to treat only foreign nationals in this way because-along
the lines of the due process argument I have just made-whether they have
a British passport or a Pakistani passport, the threat they pose to national
security is the same, and they have the same liberty interests.57 So to target
foreign nationals selectively in this way is fundamentally wrong as a matter
of human rights, not citizenship.
The best test of our commitment to the rule of law is how we treat the
most vulnerable among us. Basic protections of liberty, of freedom from
torture and related abuse, are not, and should not be, deemed privileges or
rights of citizenship, but human rights that stem from the fact of our
common humanity, not our particular nationalities.
I used as the epigraph for Enemy Aliens a quote from Hermann Cohen (a
Talmudic scholar commenting on the Bible, not the Constitution, but I think
his words are relevant here). He wrote, "The alien was to be protected, not
because he was a member of one's family, clan, or religious community;
but because he was a human being. In the alien, therefore, man discovered
the idea of humanity." 58
The real challenge we face in the wake of September 11 is whether we
can rediscover that idea of humanity. In doing so, it is essential to decouple
the notions of citizenship and basic human rights.
54. A (FC) & Others (FC) v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2
A.C. 68 (appeal taken from Eng.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a&others.pdf.
55. Id., [2005] 2 A.C. at 91-92.
56. Id., [2005] 2 A.C. at 127.
57. Cf id., [2005] 2 A.C. at 116.
58. Cole, supra note 26, at vii (quoting the words of Hermann Cohen included in the
commentary to chapter VII, verse 6, in Jeremiah: Hebrew Text and English Translation 52
(H. Freedman ed., rev. ed. 1985)).
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